elanya

I just read an interesting article by Donald Puchala entitled "Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach" (Contemporary Security Policy 26:1 pp 1-24).

In it he looks at several periods of historical piracy including in the ancient world (c. 68 BC), the fourteenth century in the Baltic and North Seas (pirates versus the Hanseatic League), the Barbay Corsairs meddling in the Mediterranean and, my favourite, the Golden Age of piracy in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. He examines some of the reasons that piracy prospered and, more importantly to him, I think, how it was suppressed. While he makes some good points in these sections (for example looking at the fact that piracy was not *internationally* illegal until very recently), he overlooks some very important points. Especially, in stressing that piracy had to be eliminated by powerful state-driven (hegemonic state driven, even) powers, he overlooks the importance and extreme success rate of clemency in ending piracy. Pompey didn't kill and drive out all the pirates - he turned them to work with him. Woodes Rogers did the same in 1718 when he showed up in Nassau, and the general pardon that preceded his arrival in the Caribbean brought the surrender of thousands of pirates, many of who did not return to their former lives of crime but took the opportunity to settle down.

Moving on, Puchala then makes a list of basic analogies between historic piracy and modern terrorism - at face value these seem to stand up, but I am not familiar enough with piracy in all the periods he discusses nor with the driving forces behind modern terrorism to really debate these, so I'll just give them to you to make of what you will, bolding the one I am interested in. I should note that he isn't saying that any of these things are true of all pirates or all terrorists, just that there are some analogous generalities:

- both are perpetuated by private organizations engaged in transnational activities;
- both begin as disparate bands, but evolve into sophisticated organizations;
- both are illegal according to the codes of many countries;
- both indiscriminately target and kill defenseless people;
- both employ terrifying tactics and instruments to attain their ends;
- both effectively use speed, stealth, deception, unorthodoxy and surprise;
- both sow anxiety and insecurity among potential target populations;
- both disrupt normal societal routines and undermine institutions;
- both recruit extraordinary leaders and fanatical followers;
- both depend for their effectiveness upon sympathizers, abettors, and co-conspirators;
- both are difficult to suppress. (p.19)

One of the things I examined in my thesis for ECU was how the demands for the eradication of piracy changed from a state based initiative to a local one - basically, the abettors of piracy came to see it as a threat to their economic security instead of as a boon, and when *this* happened, strategies for eradicating piracy were effectively employed. As I mentioned above, one of these strategies was the use of a general pardon. Basically - piracy ended because the pirates had no one to support them, and so many of them just gave up. As this was happening, pirates who had initially held some kind of nationalistic loyalty gave it up, and became even more vicious before the end. I think it is interesting that Puchala doesn't mention the Bahamas or Woodes Rogers's anti-piracy initiative at all even in his consideration of the Golden Age, although Nassau was certainly the biggest and most notorious pirate haven of its age.

As far as I can tell Puchala is trying to argue that history tells us that the only way to get rid of pirates (and by extension, how we should deal with modern terrorists) is by going out and destroying their bases with organized state based initiatives. I think this is the wrong lesson. I think the lesson we should be taking is that pirates (and, maybe, by extension modern terrorists though I'm not really willing to push this point) stopped when they had no where else to turn and that, in *conjunction* with state sponsored initiatives (and not necessarily militaristic ones) and offered clemency. Also it is notable that their abettors changed their minds because of primarily economic considerations, and *this* is probably the most useful lesson for modern times.

I think that if one anted to pursue this whole piracy/terrorism analogy, it would be interesting to more thoroughly investigate the public perceptions of piracy/terrorism versus the practical realities of belonging to either of those groups. A pirate was not necessarily a pirate *forever*. My suspicion is that if they'd never been caught (or if they'd been financially successful) it was pretty easy for a pirate to rejoin society, and though pardoned pirates did have some stigmas attached, they were certainly never ostracized... Another interesting area of investigation would be state authorized piracy such as privateering - tacit as well as official support, and any relevant parallels there.

Puchala makes a good attempt. I've seen this comparison too many times to be surprised to see a published article on it, but it is unfortunate that he doesn't have quite enough of a nuanced understanding of the periods of piracy he is talking about to make any more useful conclusions.

Personally, I should add, I am all for using historical analogies, if it is properly done, and if there is reasonable support for the analogy being made. I suspect there is something to the pirates-to-terrorists comparison, but I don't know that this is quite it.