Re: Definition/limitation as the essence of Theory (Reply).
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Fundamentally, I am and always have been an empiricist. I *like* observables, and I find the internalist, anti-evidentiary approach of many pomos and postprocessualists (Shanks and Tilley, anyone?) to be very wrongheaded. I also hold that the only well-supported hypothesis for how humans came to be what they are is biological evolution. If biological evolution is true, then to some extent, our perceptual mechanisms must reflect reality. The question of *where* they go wrong, how and why - ranging from simple ones like perceptual illusions to complex ones like ideology - is very interesting! But it too has to be studied empirically - this is the entire basis of Foucault's research into early modern power structures, or Latour's on the nature of the modern scientific enterprise.